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Mustafa Cenk Gursoy
Abstract
Secrecy capacity of a multiple-antenna wiretap channel is studied in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime.
Expressions for the first and second derivatives of the secrecy capacity with respect to SNR at SNR = 0 are derived.
Transmission strategies required to achieve these derivatives are identified. In particular, it is shown that it is optimal
in the low-SNR regime to transmit in the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace of Φ = H†mHm − NmNe H†eHe where Hm
and He denote the channel matrices associated with the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, respectively, and Nm
and Ne are the noise variances at the receiver and eavesdropper, respectively. Energy efficiency is analyzed by
finding the minimum bit energy required for secure and reliable communications, and the wideband slope. Increased
bit energy requirements under secrecy constraints are quantified. Finally, the impact of fading is investigated, and
the benefits of fading in terms of energy efficiency are shown.
Index Terms: Energy efficiency, energy per secret bit, fading channels, Gaussian channels, information-theoretic
security, low-SNR regime, MIMO systems, secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure transmission of confidential messages is a critical issue in communication systems and especially
in wireless systems due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions. In [1], Wyner addressed the
transmission security from an information-theoretic point of view, and identified the rate-equivocation
region and established the secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel in which the
wiretapper receives a degraded version of the signal observed by the legitimate receiver. The secrecy
capacity is defined as the maximum communication rate from the transmitter to the legitimate receiver,
which can be achieved while keeping the eavesdropper completely ignorant of the transmitted messages.
Later, these results are extended to Gaussian wiretap channel in [2]. In [3], Csisza´r and Ko¨rner considered
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a more general wiretap channel model and established the secrecy capacity when the transmitter has a
common message for two receivers and a confidential message to only one. Recently, there has been a
flurry of activity in the area of information-theoretic security, where, for instance, the impact of fading,
cooperation, and interference on secrecy are studied (see e.g., [4] and the articles and references therein).
Several recent results also addressed the secrecy capacity when multiple-antennas are employed by the
transmitter, receiver, and the eavedropper [5]–[9]. The secrecy capacity for the most general case in which
arbitrary number of antennas are present at each terminal has been established in [8] and [9].
In addition to security issues, another pivotal concern in most wireless systems is energy-efficient oper-
ation especially when wireless units are powered by batteries. From an information-theoretic perspective,
energy efficiency can be measured by the energy required to send one information bit reliably. It is well-
known that for unfaded and fading Gaussian channels subject to average input power constraints, energy
efficiency improves as one operates at lower SNR levels, and the minimum bit energy is achieved as
SNR vanishes [11]. Hence, requirements on energy efficiency necessitate operation in the low-SNR regime.
Additionally, operating at low SNR levels has its benefits in terms of limiting the interference in wireless
systems.
In this paper, in order to address the two critical issues of security and energy-efficiency jointly, we study
the secrecy capacity in the low-SNR regime. It is worthwhile to note that operation at low SNRs, in addition
to improving the energy efficiency, is beneficial from a security perspective as well. In the low-SNR regime,
either the transmission power is small or the bandwidth is large. In either case, we have low probability
of intercept as it is generally difficult for an eavesdropper to detect the signals in this regime.
We consider a general multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) channel model and identify the
optimal transmission strategies in the low-SNR regime under secrecy constraints. Since secrecy capacity
is in general smaller than the capacity attained in the absence of confidentiality concerns, energy per bit
requirements increase due to secrecy constraints. In this work, we quantify these increased energy costs
and address the tradeoff between secrecy and energy efficiency. The main contributions of the paper are
listed below:
1) We determine the first and second derivatives of the secrecy capacity at SNR = 0, and provide a
second-order approximation to the MIMO secrecy capacity in the low-SNR regime. Through this
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analysis, we quantify the impact of secrecy constraints on the performance.
2) We identify the optimal transmission strategies in the low-SNR regime. In particular, we determine
that transmission in the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace of a certain matrix that depends on the
channel matrices is second-order optimal. In the case in which the maximum eigenvalue is distinct,
beamforming is shown to be optimal.
3) We find the minimum energy required to send one bit both reliably and securely. We characterize
the tradeoff between energy efficiency and secrecy.
4) We investigate the impact of fading by studying the low-SNR secrecy capacity in fading scenarios.
We show that in general both independent and correlated fading improves the energy efficiency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the channel model. In
Section III, we study the secrecy capacity in the low-SNR regime and determine the minimum energy per
secret bit. We investigate the impact of fading in Section IV and provide conclusions in Section V. Lengthy
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
We consider a MIMO channel model and assume that the transmitter, legitimate receiver, and eaves-
dropper are equipped with nT , nR, and nE antennas, respectively. We further assume that the channel
input-output relations between the transmitter and legitimate receiver, and the transmitter and eavesdropper
are given by
ym = Hmx + nm and ye = Hex+ ne, (1)
respectively. Above, x denotes the nT × 1–dimensional transmitted signal vector. This channel input is
subject to the following average power constraint:
E{‖x‖2} = tr (Kx) ≤ P (2)
where tr denotes the trace operation and Kx = E{xx†} is the covariance matrix of the input. In (1),
nR× 1–dimensional ym and nE × 1–dimensional ye represent the received signal vectors at the legitimate
receiver and eavesdropper, respectively. Moreover, nm with dimension nR×1 and ne with dimension nE×1
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are independent, zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with E{nmn†m} = NmI and E{nen†e} = NeI, where
I is the identity matrix. The signal-to-noise ratio is defined as
SNR =
E{‖x‖2}
E{‖nm‖2} =
P
nRNm
. (3)
Finally, in the channel models, Hm is the nR × nT–dimensional channel matrix between the transmitter
and legitimate receiver, and He is the nE × nT–dimensional channel matrix between the transmitter and
eavesdropper. While being fixed deterministic matrices in unfaded channels, Hm and He in fading channels
are random matrices whose components denote the fading coefficients between the corresponding antennas
at the transmitting and receiving ends.
III. SECRECY IN THE LOW-SNR REGIME
Recently, in [8] and [9], it has been shown that when the channel matrices Hm and He are fixed for
the entire transmission period and are known to all three terminals1, then the secrecy capacity in nats per
dimension is given by2
Cs =
1
nR
max
Kx0
tr (Kx)≤P
log det
(
I+
1
Nm
HmKxH
†
m
)
− log det
(
I+
1
Ne
HeKxH
†
e
)
nats/s/Hz/dimension (4)
where the maximization is over all possible input covariance matrices Kx  03 subject to a trace constraint.
We note that since log det
(
I+ 1/NmHmKxH
†
m
)
is a concave function of Kx, the objective function in
(4) is in general neither concave nor convex in Kx, making the identification the optimal input covariance
matrix a difficult task for arbitrary SNR levels.
In this paper, we concentrate on the low-SNR regime. In this regime, the behavior of the secrecy capacity
can be accurately predicted by its first and second derivatives with respect to SNR at SNR = 0:
Cs(SNR) = C˙s(0)SNR +
C¨s(0)
2
SNR2 + o(SNR2). (5)
1The assumption of perfect channel knowledge can, for instance, be justified in scenarios in which a base station, which knows the channels
of the users, attempt to transmit confidential messages to a user and hence treat the other users as eavesdroppers.
2Unless stated otherwise, all logarithms throughout the paper are to the base e.
3
 and ≻ denote positive semidefinite and positive definite partial orderings, respectively, for Hermitian matrices. If A  B, then A−B
is a positive semidefinite matrix. Similarly, A ≻ B implies that A−B is positive definite.
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Moreover, C˙s(0) and C¨s(0) also enable us to analyze the energy efficiency in the low-SNR regime through
the following notions [11]:
Eb
N0 s,min
=
log 2
C˙s(0)
and S0 =
2
[
C˙s(0)
]2
−C¨s(0)
(6)
where Eb
N0 s,min
denotes the minimum bit energy required for reliable communication under secrecy con-
straints (or equivalently minimum energy per secret bit), and S0 denotes the wideband slope which is the
slope of the secrecy capacity in bits/dimension/(3 dB) at the point Eb
N0 s,min
. These quantities provide a linear
approximation of the secrecy capacity in the low-SNR regime. While Eb
N0 s,min
is a performance measure for
vanishing SNR, S0 together with EbN0 s,min characterize the performance at low but nonzero SNRs. We note
that the formula for the minimum bit energy is valid if Cs is a concave function of SNR, which we show
later in the paper.
A. First and Second Derivatives of the Secrecy Capacity
Through the following result, we identify the first and second derivatives of the secrecy capacity at
SNR = 0.
Theorem 1: The first derivative of the secrecy capacity in (4) with respect to SNR at SNR = 0 is
C˙s(0) = [λmax(Φ)]
+ =
 λmax(Φ) if λmax(Φ) > 00 else (7)
where Φ = H†mHm − NmNe H†eHe. C˙s(0) can be achieved by choosing the input covariance matrix as
Kx = P uu
† where P denotes the average power and u is the normalized eigenvector that corresponds to
λmax(Φ).
Moreover, the second derivative of the secrecy capacity at SNR = 0 is given by
C¨s(0) = −nR min
{αi}
αi∈[0,1]∀iPl
i=1 αi=1
l∑
i,j=1
αiαj
(
|u†jH†mHmui|2 −
N2m
N2e
|u†jH†eHeui|2
)
1{λmax(Φ > 0)} (8)
where l is the multiplicity of λmax(Φ) > 0, {ui} are the eigenvectors that span the maximal-eigenvalue
eigenspace of Φ, and 1{λmax(Φ) > 0} =
 1 if λmax(Φ) > 00 else is the indicator function. The second
5
derivative is achieved by choosing Kx = P
∑l
i=1 αiuiu
†
i where the values of {αi} are determined by the
optimization problem in (8).
Proof : See Appendix A.
Remark 1: In the absence of secrecy constraints, the first and second derivatives of the MIMO capacity
at SNR = 0 are [11]
C˙(0) = λmax(H
†
mHm) and C¨(0) = −
nR
l
λ2max(H
†
mHm) (9)
where l is the multiplicity of λmax(H†mHm). Hence, the first and second derivatives are achieved by
transmitting in the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace of H†mHm, the subspace in which the transmitter-
receiver channel is the strongest. Due to the optimality of the water-filling power allocation method, power
should be equally distributed in each orthogonal direction in this subspace in order for the second derivative
to be achieved.
Remark 2: We see from Theorem 1 that when there are secrecy constraints, we should at low SNRs
transmit in the direction in which the transmitter-receiver channel is strongest with respect to the transmitter-
eavesdropper channel normalized by the ratio of the noise variances. For instance, C˙s(0) can be achieved by
beamforming in the direction in which the eigenvalue of Φ is maximized. On the other hand, if λmax(Φ) has
a multiplicity, the optimization problem in (8) should be solved to identify how power should be allocated
to different orthogonal directions in the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace so that the second-derivative C¨s(0)
is attained. In general, the optimal power allocation strategy is neither water-filling nor beamforming. For
instance, consider parallel Gaussian channels for both transmitter-receiver and transmitter-eavesdropper
links, and assume that H†mHm = diag(5, 4, 2) and H†eHe = diag(2, 1, 1) where diag() is used to denote
a diagonal matrix with components provided in between the parentheses. Assume further that the noise
variances are equal, i.e., Nm = Ne. Then, it can be easily seen that λmax(Φ) = 3 and has a multiplicity
of 2. Solving the optimization problem in (8) provides α1 = 5/12 and α2 = 7/12. Hence, approximately,
42% of the power is allocated to the channel for which the transmitter-receiver link has a strength of 5,
and 58% is allocated for the channel with strength 4.
Remark 3: When λmax(Φ) > 0 is distinct, then beamforming in the direction in which λ(Φ) is maxi-
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mized is optimal in the sense of achieving both C˙s(0) and C¨s(0). Moreover, in this case, we have
C¨s(0) = −nR
(
‖Hmu1‖4 − N
2
m
N2e
‖Heu1‖4
)
(10)
where u1 is the eigenvector that corresponds to λmax(Φ).
Remark 4: From [15, Theorem 4.3.1], we know that for two Hermitian matrices A and B with the same
dimensions, we have
λmax(A+B) ≤ λmax(A) + λmax(B). (11)
Applying this result to our setting yields
λmax(Φ) ≤ λmax(H†mHm)− λmin
(
Nm
Ne
H†eHe
)
. (12)
Therefore, we conclude from Remark 1 that when λmax(Φ) > 0, secrecy constraints diminish the first
derivative C˙s(0) at least by a factor of λmin
(
Nm
Ne
H†eHe
)
when compared to the case in which there are no
such constraints.
Remark 5: In the case in which the transmitter has a single antenna (i.e, nT = 1), the channel matrices
become column vectors. Denoting these column vectors as hm and he, we can immediately see from the
result of Theorem 1 that
C˙s(0) =
[
‖hm‖2 − Nm
Ne
‖he‖2
]+
and C¨s(0) = −nR
[
‖hm‖4 − N
2
m
N2e
‖he‖4
]+
. (13)
Similarly, if each terminal has a single antenna (i.e., nT = nR = nE = 1), the results of Theorem 1
specialize to
C˙s(0) =
[
|hm|2 − Nm
Ne
|he|2
]+
and C¨s(0) = −
[
|hm|4 − N
2
m
N2e
|he|4
]+
. (14)
Heretofore, we have considered the secrecy capacity which is obtained by finding the optimal input
covariance matrix that maximizes the secrecy rate
Is(SNR) =
1
nR
[
log det
(
I+
1
Nm
HmKxH
†
m
)
− log det
(
I+
1
Ne
HeKxH
†
e
)]+
. (15)
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Hence, for a given input covariance matrix Kx, the expression in (15) provides the rate of secure communi-
cation. Using the same techniques as in the proof of Theorem 1, we can immediately obtain the following
characterization.
Corollary 1: For a given input covariance matrix Kx, the first derivative of the secrecy rate in (15) with
respect to SNR at SNR = 0 is
I˙s(0) =
[
tr
(
HmK˜xH
†
m −
Nm
Ne
HeK˜xH
†
e
)]+
=
[
tr
((
H†mHm −
Nm
Ne
H†eHe
)
K˜x
)]+
(16)
=
[
tr
(
ΦK˜x
)]+
(17)
where K˜x = 1PKx is the normalized input covariance matrix, and Φ is again defined as Φ = H
†
mHm −
Nm
Ne
H†eHe. The second derivative of the secrecy rate at SNR = 0 is given by
I¨s(0) = −nR tr
((
HmK˜xH
†
m
)2
− N
2
m
N2e
(
HeK˜xH
†
e
)2)
1
{
tr
(
ΦK˜x
)
> 0
}
. (18)
Proof : See Appendix B.
For instance, if the transmitter opts to uniformly allocate the power across the antennas, the covariance
matrix becomes Kx = PnT I. Hence, we have K˜x =
1
nT
I. In this case, we can readily see from Corollary 1
that we have
I˙s(0) =
[
1
nT
tr (Φ)
]+
=
[
1
nT
∑
i
λi(Φ)
]+
≤ [λmax(Φ)]+. (19)
This result indicates that when we have uniform power allocation, the first derivative of the secrecy rate
is proportional to the average of the eigenvalues of Φ rather than the maximum eigenvalue, and we in
general experience, as expected, a loss in performance.
We now illustrate the theoretical results through numerical analysis. We consider a system in which all
terminals have 3 antennas, i.e., nT = nR = nE = 3. Assume that the channel matrices are
Hm =

1 0.8 0.5
0.3 1 0.1
0.1 0.2 0.1
 and He =

0.5 0.4 1
0.7 0.1 0.5
0.3 0.5 0.1
 . (20)
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Fig. 1. Secrecy rates in nats/s/Hz/dimension vs. SNR.
Assume further that Nm = Ne = 1. It can be easily verified that the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix
Φ = H†mHm −H†eHe is distinct and is equal to λmax(Φ) = 1.6298. The eigenvector that corresponds to
λmax(Φ) is u† = [−0.4677 −0.8823 0.054]. Therefore, the covariance matrix that is optimal in the sense
of achieving both the first and second derivatives of the secrecy capacity is Kx = P uu†. In Figure 1 in
which secrecy rates are plotted as a function of SNR, the dashed curve shows the secrecy rates achieved
when this input covariance matrix is employed. Note that this secrecy rate curve is optimally close to
the secrecy capacity in the low-SNR regime as it has the same first and second derivatives. Note also that
for the considered model, we have C˙s(0) = λmax(Φ) = 1.6298. Fig. 1 also provides secrecy rates for
two suboptimal choices of Kx. The dot-dashed curve plots the secrecy rates when Kx = P vv† where
v is the eigenvector that corresponds to λmax(H†mHm). Hence, transmission in this case is performed in
the direction in which the channel between the transmitter and legitimate receiver is strongest. Note that
this strategy is optimal in the low-SNR regime if there are no secrecy considerations. However, as we also
observe in the figure, it is in general suboptimal in the wiretap channel model. Even the slope at zero
SNR is smaller. Indeed, the slope is I˙s(0) = tr (ΦK˜x) = 1.2444. In Fig. 1, we also plot the secrecy rates
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(with the dotted curve) when the power is uniformly allocated across the antennas. In this case, we have
I˙s(0) =
1
3
tr (Φ) = 0.18, which is about 11% of C˙s(0). Inefficiency of uniform power allocation is further
evidenced in the observation that the secrecy rates start diminishing as SNR is increased beyond 0.94, due
to the fact that transmission is also possibly being conducted in the directions in which the eavesdropper’s
channel is strong and consequently, increasing the power improves the eavesdropper’s ability to wiretap
the channel. Finally, as a comparison, we plot in Fig. 1 the rates achieved in the absence of secrecy
constraints when Kx = P vv† with v as defined above. For this case, the first derivative of the capacity is
λmax(H
†
mH) = 2.7676.
B. Minimum Energy per Secret Bit
In this section, we study the energy required to send information both reliably and securely. In particular,
we investigate the minimum energy required to send one secret bit. Before identifying the minimum energy
per secret bit, we first show that the secrecy capacity is concave in SNR.
Proposition 1: The secrecy capacity Cs achieved under the average power constraint E{‖x‖2} ≤ P is
a concave function of SNR.
Proof: Concavity can be easily shown using the time-sharing argument. Assume that at power level P1
and signal-to-noise ratio SNR1, the optimal input is x1, which satisfies E{‖x1‖2} ≤ P1, and the secrecy
capacity is Cs(SNR1). Similarly, for P2 and SNR2, the optimal input is x2, which satisfies E{‖x2‖2} ≤ P2,
and the secrecy capacity is Cs(SNR2). Now, we assume that the transmitter performs time-sharing by
transmitting at two different power levels using x1 and x2. More specifically, in θ fraction of the time,
the transmitter uses the input x1, transmits at most at P1, and achieves the secrecy rate Cs(SNR1). In the
remaining (1 − θ) fraction of the time, the transmitter employs x2, transmits at most at P2, and achieves
the secrecy rate Cs(SNR2). Hence, this scheme overall achieves the average secrecy rate of
θCs(SNR1) + (1− θ)Cs(SNR2) (21)
by transmitting at the level θE{‖x1‖2}+ (1− θ)E{‖x2‖2} ≤ Pθ = θP1 + (1− θ)P2. The average signal-
to-noise ratio is SNRθ = θSNR1 + (1− θ)SNR2. Therefore, the secrecy rate in (21) is an achievable secrecy
rate at SNRθ. Since the secrecy capacity is the maximum achievable secrecy rate, the secrecy capacity at
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SNRθ is larger than that in (21), i.e.,
Cs(SNRθ) = Cs(θSNR1 + (1− θ)SNR2) ≥ θCs(SNR1) + (1− θ)Cs(SNR2), (22)
showing the concavity. 
We further note that the concavity can also be shown using the following facts. As also discussed in
[10], MIMO secrecy capacity is obtained by proving in the converse argument that the considered upper
bound is tight and
Cs = max
p(x)
min
p(y′r ,y
′
e|x)∈D
I(x;y
′
r|y
′
e) (23)
where D is the set of joint conditional density functions p(y′r,y′e|x) that satisfy p(y′r|x) = p(yr|x) and
p(y
′
e|x) = p(ye|x). Note that for fixed channel distributions, the mutual information I(x;y′r|y′e) is a
concave function of the input distribution p(x). Since the pointwise infimum of a set of concave functions
is concave [16], f(p(x)) = minp(y′r,y′e|x)∈D I(x;y
′
r|y′e) is also a concave function of p(x). Concavity of the
functional f and the fact that maximization is over input distributions satisfying E{‖x‖2} ≤ P lead to the
concavity of the secrecy capacity with respect to SNR.
The energy per secret bit normalized by the noise variance at the legitimate receiver is defined as
Eb
N0 s
=
SNR
Cs(SNR)
log 2. (24)
As mentioned before, since the secrecy capacity is a concave function of SNR, the minimum energy per
secret bit is achieved as SNR → 0 and hence is given by
Eb
N0 s,min
= lim
SNR→0
SNR
Cs(SNR)
log 2 =
log 2
C˙s(0)
. (25)
We can now write the following corollary to Proposition 1 and Theorem 1.
Corollary 2: The minimum bit energy attained under secrecy constraints (i.e., minimum energy per
secret bit) is
Eb
N0 s,min
=
log 2
[λmax(Φ)]+
. (26)
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Remark 6: From Remark 4, we can write for λmax(Φ) > 0
Eb
N0 s,min
=
log 2
λmax(Φ)
≥ log 2
λmax(H
†
mHm)− λmin
(
Nm
Ne
H
†
eHe
) ≥ log 2
λmax(H
†
mHm)
=
Eb
N0 min
(27)
where Eb
N0 min
in (27) denotes the minimum bit energy in the absence of secrecy constraints. Hence, in
general, secrecy requirements increase the energy expenditure. When secure communication is not possible,
[λmax(Φ)]
+ = 0 and Eb
N0 s,min
=∞.
Remark 7: Energy costs of secrecy can easily be identified in the case in which the transmitter has a
single-antenna. Clearly, the minimum bit energy in the presence of secrecy is strictly greater than that in
the absence of such constraints:
Eb
N0 s,min
=
log 2[
‖hm‖2 − NmNe ‖he‖2
]+ > log 2‖hm‖2 = EbN0min (28)
when Nm
Ne
‖he‖2 > 0. Furthermore, the energy requirement increases monotonically as the value of NmNe ‖he‖2
increases. Indeed, when Nm
Ne
‖he‖2 = ‖hm‖2, secure communication is not possible and EbN0 s,min =∞.
The expression for the wideband slope S0 can be readily obtained by plugging in the expressions in (7)
and (8) into that in (6):
S0 =
2
[
C˙s(0)
]2
−C¨s(0)
=
2 ([λmax(Φ)]
+)
2
nRmin {αi}
αi∈[0,1] ∀iPl
i=1 αi=1
∑l
i,j=1 αiαj
(
|u†jH†mHmui|2 − N
2
m
N2e
|u†jH†eHeui|2
)
1{λmax(Φ > 0)}
.
In Fig. 2, we plot the secrecy rates in bits/s/Hz/dimension as a function of the energy per secret bit
Eb
N0 s
under the same assumptions and channel model as in Fig. 1. We see, as predicted, that the minimum
bit energy is attained in all cases as SNR and hence rates approach zero. While the minimum bit energy
is Eb
N0 min
= log 2
λmax(H
†
mHm)
= −6.01 dB in the absence of secrecy constraints, the minimum bit energy per
secret bit is Eb
N0 s,min
= log 2
λmax(Φ)
= −3.71 dB. Therefore, secrecy constraints lead to an increase of 2.3 dB
in the minimum energy requirements. We also note that the energy cost of secrecy increases as secrecy
rates increase. Moreover, we observe that the suboptimal choices of Kx induce additional energy penalties.
When we have Kx = Pvv† where v is the eigenvector that corresponds to λmax(H†mHm), the minimum
bit energy is −2.54 dB. In the case of uniform power allocation, the minimum bit energy requirement
12
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jumps to 5.85 dB.
IV. THE IMPACT OF FADING
In this section, we assume that the channel matrices Hm and He are random matrices whose components
are ergodic random variables, modeling fading in wireless transmissions. We again assume that realizations
of these matrices are perfectly known by all the terminals. As discussed in [12], fading channel can be
regarded as a set of parallel subchannels each of which corresponds to a particular fading realization.
Hence, in each subchannel, the channel matrices are fixed similarly as in the channel model considered in
the previous section. In [12], Liang et al. have shown that having independent inputs for each subchannel is
optimal and the secrecy capacity of the set of parallel subchannels is equal to the sum of the capacities of
subchannels. Therefore, the secrecy capacity of fading channels can be be found by averaging the secrecy
capacities attained for different fading realizations.
We assume that the transmitter is subject to a short-term power constraint. Hence, for each channel
realization, the same amount of power is used and we have tr (Kx) ≤ P . With this assumption, the
13
transmitter is allowed to perform power adaptation in space across the antennas, but not across time.
Under such constraints, it can easily be seen from the above discussion that the average secrecy capacity
in fading channels is given by
Cs =
1
nR
EHm,He
{
max
Kx0
tr (Kx)≤P
log det
(
I+
1
Nm
HmKxH
†
m
)
− log det
(
I+
1
Ne
HeKxH
†
e
)}
where the expectation is with respect to the joint distribution of (Hm,He). Note that the only difference
between (4) and (29) is the presence of expectation in (29). Due to this similarity, the following result can
be obtained immediately as a corollary to Theorem 1.
Corollary 3: The first derivative of the average secrecy capacity in (29) with respect to SNR at SNR = 0
is
C˙s(0) = EHm,He{[λmax(Φ)]+} (29)
where again Φ = H†mHm − NmNe H†eHe. The second derivative of the average secrecy capacity at SNR = 0
is given by
C¨s(0) = −nREHm,He
{
min
{αi}
αi∈[0,1] ∀iPl
i=1 αi=1
l∑
i,j=1
αiαj
(
|u†jH†mHmui|2 −
N2m
N2e
|u†jH†eHeui|2
)
1{λmax(Φ) > 0}
}
(30)
where 1{·} again denotes the indicator function, l is the multiplicity of λmax(Φ) > 0, and {ui} are the
eigenvectors that span the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace for particular realizations of Hm and He.
Remark 8: Similarly as in the unfaded case, C˙s(0) is achieved by always transmitting in the maximal-
eigenvalue eigenspace of the realizations of the matrix Φ. In order to achieve the second derivative, optimal
values of {αi} (or equivalently the optimal power allocation across the antennas) should be identified again
for each possible realization of Φ.
Remark 9: In the case in which nT = 1, the first and second derivatives of the average secrecy capacity
become
C˙s(0) = Ehm,he
{[
‖hm‖2 − Nm
Ne
‖he‖2
]+}
and C¨s(0) = −nREhm,he
{[
‖hm‖4 − N
2
m
N2e
‖he‖4
]+}
.
Similarly as in Section III-B, we can identify the minimum energy per secret bit as follows.
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Corollary 4: The minimum energy per secret bit required in fading channels is
Eb
N0 s,min
=
log 2
EHm,He{[λmax(Φ)]+}
. (31)
Remark 10: Fading has a potential to improve the low-SNR performance and hence the energy efficiency.
To illustrate this, we consider the following example. Assume nT = nR = nE = 1. Consider first the
unfaded Gaussian channel in which the deterministic channel coefficients are hm = he = 1. For this case,
we have
C˙s(0) =
[
1− Nm
Ne
]+
and Eb
N0 s,min
=
log 2[
1− Nm
Ne
]+ . (32)
Now, consider a Rayleigh fading environment and assume that hm and he are independent, zero-mean,
circularly symmetric Gaussian random variables with variances E{|hm|2} = E{|he|2} = 1. Then, we can
easily find that
C˙s(0) = Ehm,he
{[
|hm|2 − Nm
Ne
|he|2
]+}
=
Ne
Nm +Ne
(33)
leading to Eb
N0 s,min
= log 2Ne
Nm+Ne
. Note that if Ne > 0, NeNm+Ne >
[
1− Nm
Ne
]+
. Hence, fading strictly improves the
low-SNR performance by increasing C˙s(0) and decreasing the minimum bit energy even without performing
power control over time. Further gains are possible with power adaptation. Another interesting observation
is the following. In unfaded channels, if Nm ≥ Ne, the minimum bit energy is infinite and secure
communication is not possible. On the other hand, in fading channels, the bit energy is finite as long as Nm
is finite and Ne > 0. Clearly, even if Nm ≥ Ne, favorable fading conditions enable secure transmission in
fading channels. The positive impact of fading on secrecy rates especially at low SNRs has been discussed
for instance in [13] and [14]. Here, we provide a similar observation from the energy efficiency perspective.
Above, we have assumed that the fading coefficients hm and he are independent. Next, we demonstrate
that the gains are still observed even if the channel coefficients are correlated. We again assume that hm
and he are zero-mean, circularly symmetric Gaussian random variables with E{|hm|2} = E{|he|2} = 1.
Let us denote rm = |hm|, zm = |hm|2 and re = |he|, ze = |he|2. Using the following bivariate Rayleigh
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probability density function given in [17, Equation 6.2]
f(rm, re) =
4rmre
1− ρ e
− 1
1−ρ
(r2m+r
2
e) I0
(
2
√
ρ r2mr
2
e
1− ρ
)
, (34)
we can easily obtain the bivariate exponential density as
f(zm, ze) =
1
1− ρ e
− 1
1−ρ
(zm+ze) I0
(
2
√
ρ zmze
1− ρ
)
. (35)
In the above formulation, I0 denotes the zeroth order modified Bessel function of the first kind. Moreover,
ρ denotes the power correlation coefficient, which is related to the correlation coefficients of the underlying
Gaussian random variables hm and he, and is given by [17]
ρ =
|E{hmh∗e}|2
E{|hm|2}E{|he|2} (36)
under the assumption that hm and he are zero-mean. With this characterization, we can now easily compute
C˙s(0) = Ehm,he
{[
|hm|2 − NmNe |he|2
]+}
, from which we can obtain the minimum energy per secret bit
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Eb
N0 s,min
= log 2
C˙s(0)
. In Fig. 3, the minimum energy per secret bit is plotted as a function of the correlation
coefficient ρ. When ρ = 0 and hence the channel coefficients are independent, we have Eb
N0 s,min
= log 2Ne
Nm+Ne
=
log 2
0.5
= 1.419 dB. As the correlation increases, the minimum bit energy value increases. However, note that
the bit energy values are finite unless there is full correlation. Note further that if there were no fading,
we would have Eb
N0 s,min
= log 2
[1−NmNe ]
+ =∞ (recalling the assumption that Nm = Ne = 1). Hence, in general,
correlated fading provides improvements in secure communication as well.
Above, improvements in the minimum energy per secret bit, which is attained as SNR vanishes, are
discussed. In general, fading is beneficial in terms of energy efficiency at nonzero SNR levels as well. This
is demonstrated in Fig. 4. In this figure, we plot the secrecy capacity when nT = 1, nR = 5, and nE = 3.
We consider two scenarios: no fading and i.i.d. Rayleigh fading. In the case in which there is no fading, we
assume that the channel coefficients are all equal to 1. In the fading scenario, we assume that the channel
vectors hm and he consist of independent and identically distributed, zero-mean Gaussian components each
with unit variance, i.e., E{|hm,i|2} = 1 and E{|he,i|2} = 1 for all i. We additionally assume that hm and
17
−10 −5 0 5 10 15 20
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
Eb/N0s (dB)
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ca
pa
cit
y 
(bi
ts/
s/H
z/d
im
en
sio
n)
nR = 1
nR = 10
nR = 5
nR = 4
nR = 3
nR = 2
Fig. 5. Secrecy capacity in bits/s/Hz/dimension vs. energy per secret bit Eb
N0 s
in i.i.d. Rayleigh fading when nT = 1 and nE = 3.
he are independent of each other. Note that under these assumptions, ‖hm‖2 and ‖he‖2 are independent
chi-square random variables with 2nR and 2nE degrees of freedom, respectively. In Fig. 4, we observe that
better performance is achieved in the presence of fading. As readily seen, the minimum energy per secret
bit required in Rayleigh fading is smaller. Moreover, for a given secrecy capacity value, less bit energy is
needed in the presence of fading. Indeed, energy gains tend to increase at higher values of secrecy capacity.
For instance, when Cs = 0.14 bits/s/Hz/dimension, we have a gain of approximately 8 dB in EbN0 s. Note
that this is a substantial improvement in energy efficiency.
As another benefit, fading enables secure communication, which otherwise is not possible in a non-
fading environment. For instance, under the assumptions that nT = 1 and all channel coefficients are equal
to 1, secrecy capacity is zero if the legitimate receiver has the same as or less number of antennas than the
eavesdropper. However, this is not necessarily the case in fading scenarios. Due to the randomness of fading
coefficients, there are instants with non-zero probabilities, in which the main channel is stronger than the
eavesdropper’s channel even though nR ≤ nE . This is illustrated in Fig. 5 in which we plot the secrecy
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capacity as a function of Eb
N0 s
in i.i.d. Rayleigh fading for different values of nR when we have nT = 1
and nE = 3. Note that even when nR ≤ 3, we require finite bit energy for secure communications. In the
above-mentioned non-fading scenario, we would have Eb
N0 s
= ∞. Additionally, we note that performance,
as expected, improves and less energy per secret bit is required as the number of receive antennas nR
increases.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the MIMO secrecy capacity in the low-SNR regime. We have obtained
expressions for the first and second derivatives of the secrecy capacity at SNR = 0. Using these expressions,
we have identified the optimal transmission strategies in the low-SNR regime under secrecy constraints. In
particular, we have shown that it is optimal to transmit in the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace of the matrix
Φ = H†mHm − NmNe H†eHe. We have compared the low-SNR results with those obtained in the absence of
secrecy constraints, and quantified the degradation in the performance. We have determined the minimum
bit energy required for secure and reliable communications in the presence of an eavesdropper. We have
shown that secrecy in general increases the bit energy requirements. We have also noted that the suboptimal
choices of transmission strategies can incur additional energy penalties. Numerical results are provided to
illustrate the theoretical findings. Following the analysis for the fixed channel, we have investigated the
low-SNR secrecy capacity in the presence of fading. We have generalized our derivative results to apply
to the perfectly-known fading channel. We have demonstrated the benefits of fading in terms of energy
efficiency.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We first note that the input covariance matrix Kx = E{xx†} is by definition a positive semidefinite
Hermitian matrix. As a Hermitian matrix, Kx can be written as [15, Theorem 4.1.5]
Kx = UΛU
† (37)
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where U is a unitary matrix and Λ is a real diagonal matrix. Using (37), we can also express Kx as
Kx =
nT∑
i=1
diuiu
†
i (38)
where {di} are the diagonal components of Λ, and {ui} are the column vectors of U and form an
orthonormal set. Assuming that the input uses all the available power, we have tr (Kx) =
∑nT
i=1 di = P .
Noting that Kx is positive semidefinite and hence di ≥ 0, we can write di = αiP where αi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i and∑nT
i=1 αi = 1. Now, the secrecy rate achieved with a particular covariance matrix Kx can be expressed as
Is(SNR) =
1
nR
(
log det
(
I+ nR SNR
nT∑
i=1
αiHmuiu
†
iH
†
m
)
− log det
(
I+
nRNm
Ne
SNR
nT∑
i=1
αiHeuiu
†
iH
†
e
))
.
where SNR is defined in (3). As also noted in [11], we can easily show that
d
dv
log det(I+ vA)
∣∣∣∣
v=0
= tr (A), (39)
d2
dv2
log det(I+ vA)
∣∣∣∣
v=0
= −tr (A2). (40)
Now, using (39), we obtain the following expression for the first derivative of the secrecy rate Is with
respect to SNR at SNR = 0:
I˙s(0) =
nT∑
i=1
αi
(
tr (Hmuiu
†
iH
†
m)−
Nm
Ne
tr (Heuiu
†
iH
†
e)
)
(41)
=
nT∑
i=1
αi
(
u
†
iH
†
mHmui −
Nm
Ne
u
†
iH
†
eHeui
)
(42)
=
nT∑
i=1
αiu
†
i
(
H†mHm −
Nm
Ne
H†eHe
)
ui =
nT∑
i=1
αiu
†
iΦui (43)
where (42) follows from the property that tr (AB) = tr (BA). Also, in (43), we have defined Φ =
H†mHm − NmNe H†eHe. Since Φ is a Hermitian matrix and {ui} are unit vectors, we have [15, Theorem
4.2.2]
u
†
iΦui ≤ λmax(Φ) ∀i (44)
where λmax(Φ) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix Φ. Recall that αi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i αi = 1.
Then, from (44), we obtain
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I˙s(0) =
nT∑
i=1
αiu
†
iΦui ≤ λmax(Φ). (45)
Note that this upper bound can be achieved if, for instance, α1 = 1 and αi = 0 ∀i 6= 1, and u1 is chosen as
the eigenvector that corresponds to the maximum eigenvalue of Φ. Heretofore, we have implicitly assumed
that λmax(Φ) > 0 and all the available power is used to transmit the information in the direction of the
maximum eigenvalue. If λmax(Φ) ≤ 0, then all eigenvalues of Φ are less than or equal to zero, and
hence Φ is a negative semidefinite matrix. In this situation, none of the channels of the legitimate receiver
is stronger than those corresponding ones of the eavesdropper. In such a case, secrecy capacity is zero.
Therefore, if λmax(Φ) ≤ 0, we have C˙s(0) = 0. Finally, we conclude from (45) and the above discussion
that the first derivative of the secrecy capacity with respect to SNR at SNR = 0 is given by
C˙s(0) = [λmax(Φ)]
+ =
 λmax(Φ) if λmax(Φ) > 00 else . (46)
If λmax(Φ) > 0 is distinct, C˙s(0) is achieved when we choose Kx = Pu1u†1 where u1 is the eigenvector
that corresponds to λmax(Φ). Therefore, beamforming in the direction in which the eigenvalue of Φ is
maximized is optimal in the sense of achieving the first derivative of the secrecy capacity in the low-SNR
regime. More generally, if λmax(Φ) > 0 has a multiplicity, any covariance matrix in the following form
achieves the first derivative:
Kx = P
l∑
i=1
αiuiu
†
i (47)
where l is the multiplicity of the maximum eigenvalue, {ui}li=1 are the eigenvectors that span the maximal-
eigenvalue eigenspace of Φ, and {αi}li=1 are constants, taking values in [0, 1] and having the sum
∑l
i=1 αi =
1. Therefore, transmission in the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace is necessary to achieve C˙s(0).
Next, we consider the second derivative of the secrecy capacity. Again, when λmax(Φ) ≤ 0, the secrecy
capacity is zero and therefore C¨s(0) = 0. Hence, in the following, we consider the case in which λmax(Φ) >
0. Suppose that the input covariance matrix is chosen as in (47) with a particular set of {αi}. Then, using
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(40), we can obtain
I¨s(0) = −nR tr
( l∑
i=1
αiHmuiu
†
iH
†
m
)2+ nRN2m
N2e
tr
( l∑
i=1
αiHeuiu
†
iH
†
e
)2 (48)
= −nR
∑
i,j
αiαj
(
|u†jH†mHmui|2 −
N2m
N2e
|u†jH†eHeui|2
)
(49)
where (49) is obtained by using the fact that tr (AB) = tr (BA) and performing some straightforward
manipulations. Note again that {ui} are the eigenvectors spanning the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace of
Φ. Being necessary to achieve the first derivative, the covariance structure given in (47) is also necessary
to achieve the second derivative. Therefore, the second derivative of the secrecy capacity at SNR = 0 is the
maximum of the expression in (49) over all possible values of {αi}. Hence,
C¨s(0) = −nR min
{αi}
αi∈[0,1]∀iPl
i=1 αi=1
∑
i,j
αiαj
(
|u†jH†mHmui|2 −
N2m
N2e
|u†jH†eHeui|2
)
(50)
Since C¨s(0) is equal to the expression in (50) when λmax(Φ) > 0 and is zero otherwise, the final expression
in (8) is obtained by multiplying the formula in (50) with the indicator function 1{λmax(Φ) > 0}. 
B. Proof of Corollary 1
The secrecy rate is expressed as
Is(SNR) =
1
nR
[
log det
(
I+
1
Nm
HmKxH
†
m
)
− log det
(
I+
1
Ne
HeKxH
†
e
)]+
. (51)
Defining the normalized input covariance matrix as K˜x = 1PKx, we can rewrite the secrecy rate as
Is(SNR) =
1
nR
[
log det
(
I+ nR SNRHmK˜xH
†
m
)
− log det
(
I+
nRNm
Ne
SNRHeK˜xH
†
e
)]+
. (52)
where we, similarly as before, have SNR = P
nRNm
. Then, using (39), we immediately have
I˙s(0) =
[
tr
(
HmK˜xH
†
m
)
− tr
(
Nm
Ne
HeK˜xH
†
e
)]+
=
[
tr
(
HmK˜xH
†
m −
Nm
Ne
HeK˜xH
†
e
)]+
. (53)
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In order to obtain the second derivative, we can apply (40) to the positive part of the secrecy rate to obtain
I¨s(0) = −nR
(
tr
((
HmK˜xH
†
m
)2)
− tr
(
N2m
N2e
(
HeK˜xH
†
e
)2))
(54)
= −nR
(
tr
((
HmK˜xH
†
m
)2
− N
2
m
N2e
(
HeK˜xH
†
e
)2))
. (55)
Note that the above expression is the second derivative of the positive part of the secrecy rate, and hence
applies only when the secrecy rate is positive. If the secrecy rate is zero, the second derivative is also zero,
and hence we have the indicator function in the final expression in (18). 
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